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any introduction of religious terms into the public schools. I believe that we have shuddered unnecessarily. Our nation, founded for religious ends, cannot survive free, united, and consecrated without them. Our moral teaching cannot carry its greatest message unless it bears with it the love not only of man, but of God. We have overweighted the second Christian commandment in our generation; we are so concerned with doing for one another that often enough we know not what we do. I mean this literally. How can we make sure that giving higher wages, better health, shorter hours, will not lead to extravagance, animalism, misuse of leisure? These gifts are only safe when they are used for good and not evil and they can only be rightly used when they are used in defence of the first commandment. It will be said at once that we cannot have any religious code in the public schools. After having accepted this statement for years I have come to doubt it. I believe that it would be not only a possible proceeding, but a salvation to our nation if we could put into the public schools the creed that Washington and Lincoln held as theirs. The Jews must welcome it for it is drawn from the Old Testament; the Greek, the Catholic and all the Protestant churches hold it; all the churchless respect it. I throw out, therefore, for full discussion this thesis:—

All public school teaching and especially all education for character should be openly based on the two Great Commandments, "Thou shalt love the Lord thy God with all thy heart, and with all thy soul, and with all thy mind, and with all thy strength"; and, "Thou shalt love thy neighbor as thyself."

ELLA LYMAN CABOT.

A REALISTIC UNIVERSE. By John Elof Boodin. New York: Macmillan Company, 1916. Pp. XXII, 412.

The period of the war produced a number of philosophical works of more than ordinary interest, which in the preoccupation of the time failed to receive the recognition which their intrinsic merit suggested, and which they would have received in less troubled circumstances. Among the most important of these is the stout volume of metaphysics before us, which is the sequel of the author's earlier book, *Truth and Reality*, published in 1911. Together the two volumes furnish a general survey of philosophy from the point of view of pragmatic realism, and, taken together

with the numerous articles published in various journals during the same period, bear praiseworthy testimony to the philosophic faith and industry of their author.

The work falls into five parts, entitled respectively "Energy and Things," "Consciousness and Mind," "Space and Reality," "Time and Reality," "Form and Reality." While the volume as a whole has ethical implications, and might even be said to culminate in ethics, the only parts devoted explicitly to ethical topics in the narrower sense are chapter XI, "Individual and Social Minds," and chapters XVI and XVII, "The Identity of the Ideals," and "Form and the Ought." I confine myself here to the ethical and sociological discussions in question.

The chapter on "Individual and Social Minds" contends against the common view of the isolation of minds, which is based on scientific abstraction, not on intuited facts. Both the process of external representation and of analogical inference presuppose immediate social acquaintance. "We become conscious of being minds through our interaction with other minds." Moreover, a true view of the self will reveal it as a product of this social intercourse. "The relation here, as in chemical compounds, affects the natures of the terms, and is not merely an external relation between abstract entities." The ego, conceived apart from its social situation, is an abstraction. The concept of a social mind, as something other than its component individual minds, is defended, and various traits, such as the subject-object character, unity, indentity, worth and immortality are attributed to it.

Chapter XVI sets forth the identity of the ideals of truth, beauty and virtue as regards their formal character, or the demands which their respective objects must meet, the demands for unity, harmony, simplicity and universality. In the case of a moral deed, for example, when it "follows from no principle. . . . we abandon the ethical criterion of good or bad." Science, art and morality are different in the concrete, as they are identical in the abstract. The matter of science is conceptual relations, that of art is the concrete imagination, that of ethics is impulse. Even here, however, "while the concrete values or ways of realization are different for thought, feeling and character; while they lead to unique satisfaction of the will, they must support and supplement each other, and, because subjected to the same ideal demands, they must fundamentally and ultimately

agree with each other. That is, the truth must, without surrendering its specific character as true, also be found beautiful and noble; and so with the other ideal values."

Chapter XVII, "Form and the Ought," discusses the concept of absolute direction, to which no definite content is assignable, but is merely the demand for law and worth in the moral life. Its discovery is provisional and tentative, coming "through the growing insight of the individual as he strives honestly to master his data." It is the categorical imperative, commanding unconditionally. "It does not grow out of our inclinations and impulses, but it determines the worth of these. . . . It means orderliness and comprehensiveness in the regulation of individual as well as social life. It is the law that there shall be law." It even transcends and determines reason. The universe itself is an ethical process, the direction of which is overindividual. Without such an objective form or direction, neither validity or worth would have any meaning. In radical empiricism no ideal could be valid. "If validity is made, is a matter of convention merely, what objective coerciveness can it exercise, what standard can it furnish for the permanency of values?" Nor would the difficulty be relieved by regarding the race as the unit. "Certain values prove permanent and necessary, not because the race has willed them, but because when the race in any of its members does will them or feel them, they prove themselves intrinsically superior or higher; they set conditions of survival to the race because of the social unity and co-operation thus made possible." Direction, if I read the author rightly, appears as something determined by a force outside history and humanity altogether. Evolution itself must derive its meaning from the concept of direction. Form or direction is not a product of reflection. "Reflection cannot create this demand for meaning and unity, for it presupposes this very demand." Here our thinker threatens to abandon thinking and take refuge in faith. "Why should we not trust our faith in the formal categories as we trust our faith in the mechanical?" Eventually, it would appear, the direction of evolution is after all not objective, but is entrusted to a perfect Socius, "an omniscient selective activity, with power commensurate with his formal demands. . . . Such a being would guarantee that universal efficacy of form in the cosmos which we implicitly postulate."

As will be seen even from the brief passages reported here, the

author often merely revives and restates, but hardly settles all the ancient controversies. In the style of the book, as in the thought, there are here and there loose ends, and rough places, as indeed there should be in a realistic universe like this. The book as a whole reveals an original, flexible and erudite intelligence, it abounds in shrewd and homely comments, and, with all that may be said in criticism of either conception or workmanship in the details, will stand as one of the substantial additions to the American literature of philosophy.

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SHORTER NOTICES.

LECTURES ON SEX AND HEREDITY. By F. O. Bower, J. Graham Kerr, and W. E. Agar. London: Macmillan and Co., 1919. Pp. vi, 119. Price, 5s. net.

A course of lectures delivered in Glasgow, and claiming to convey in as simple terms as possible the leading facts relating to sex in animals and plants. It forms a very useful little book which all who wish to talk at large on sex and heredity should read for the clear and exact basis of fact it provides. There is a good glossary and index; but the general reader will be disappointed in the absence of any reference to the difficulty he always wants solving as to how any evolutionary progress is possible without the inheritance of acquired characteristics. A. E. H.

THE PHILOSOPHY OF CONFLICT, AND OTHER ESSAYS IN WAR-TIME. (Second Series.) By Havelock Ellis. London: Constable & Co., Ltd., 1919. Pp. 299. Price, 6s. 6d. net.

These collected essays of Mr. Havelock Ellis are a witness to the wide range and flexibility of his mind. He moves with ease among problems of conflict, eugenics, sex, and also among the lighter literary articles upon Cowley, Conrad and Baudelaire, which are, as it were, make-weights. The charm of his approach and his sympathetic method is over all; as in his classic contributions to the questions of sex.

THE MAKING OF HUMANITY. By Robert Briffault. London: G. Allen & Unwin, Ltd., 1919. Pp. 371. Price, 12s. 6d. net.

The Making of Humanity is verbose, when the author is dealing with theory, but often, fresh, graphic and vivid when he is in touch with solid fact. His historical *aperçus* such as the debt of the world to Arab science—Dar Al-Hikmet (p. 184) and the picture of the sterile kingdom of Byzantium are of no little interest and power. But when he leaves the paths of history, and bids us consider awakening science crashing "through the tinsel vaults of puerile cosmologies, discovering the sun-strewn infinities amongst which speeds our quivering earth speck," we recall Verlaine's advice, "Take eloquence, and wring her neck."

Stripped of verbiage, the thesis of the book is that man is a rational being, and rational thought is the thing that makes for morality and civilisation.

N. C.